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Abstract 
This article analyses the role as scapegoat and the ‘mirroring’ function performed 
by immigrants in societies where levels of economic inequality are increasing, and 
welfare structures are being constantly contracted. The central argument of this article 
is that, in a situation of prolonged economic crisis, political elites can blame certain 
minority groups for causing difficulties that really arise from macrosocial factors.  
In the first section, the article examines the creation in and by the media of the 
image of immigrants as ‘the enemy within’, demonstrating the arbitrariness of this 
categorisation and how it acts as a catalyst for the discontent felt by native 
populations, in particular the Italian people. The social construction of immigrants as 
potential perils to law and order and as unfair competitors in the job market and in 
applications for welfare resources (which does not find confirmation in scientific 
research) also performs the function of legitimising the political elites in a time of 
enduring economic crisis and changes in the capitalist economic model. 
The second section illustrates the dynamics, causes and consequences of the 
growth of economic inequality in economies around the world, with wages and 
pensions falling. States find themselves in great difficulty trying to counteract these 
processes of impoverishment in the population with social welfare measures. 
The third and final section looks at the ‘mirroring’ function performed by 
immigrants. They act as a convenient catalyst for the anger of the native populations, 
in part because the conditions of financial uncertainty and social marginalisation in 
which immigrants so often live are also beginning to seem like the probable future for 
the natives. Therefore, immigrants show us an image of poverty and uncertainty 
which seemed to have been definitely defeated through the development of welfare 
systems but is returning. 
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1.  Foreword 
For at least twenty years now, how immigration is handled has been one 
of the main topics for political and media debate across Europe. Although the 
number of news items produced by the mass media system on this topic is 
enormous, only rarely is the public presented with any kind of objective 
information on the matter. For example, in Italy, only the most alarming 
aspects of immigration get airtime or column inches, i.e. when crimes or 
matters concerning general law and order are involved. The very laws 
governing immigration to Italy are marked by a strong orientation towards 
policing emergency situations and safeguarding law and order, while much less 
attention is paid to matters of social integration. 
All of this helps us understand how it is that the public image of non-EU 
immigrants is so negative in Europe as a whole and in particular in Italy, and 
also why immigrants are perceived as dangerous by the majority of the 
population. Of course, we cannot deny that there are certain difficulties in 
accommodating cultures which, regarding certain issues (e.g. the social role of 
women, or the separation of civil and religious activities), at times display 
elements of conflict, although it must be said that the issue of managing 
cultural differences is often described in the public debate as if it were a 
struggle between monolithic and immutable symbolic spheres. However, the 
processes of cultural change which migrant populations undergo have been 
described in great detail over the years, starting with the Chicago School 
studies of European immigrants to the USA. More than cultural differences, it 
is other factors which feed into the hostility expressed by politicians and in 
public debate about foreign nationals.  
In this paper, we discuss in particular the fact that immigrants can easily 
be used as catalysts for the anger of native populations when they (the natives) 
are suffering a situation of crisis marked by an increase in financial instability 
and lack of job security together with public welfare structures in decline. 
Over the course of human history, the ‘scapegoat’ mechanism has time and 
again shown itself to be highly useful in restructuring the symbolic borders of 
a social group exposed to a situation of peril and suffering a loss of internal 
solidarity and unity. Parsons (1994) explained the rise of Nazism and the 
extermination of the Jews in Germany, a society with one of the highest levels 
of schooling in the world, but which, after the First World War, found itself 
having to face one of the deepest economic crises in the history of capitalism 
without a political subsystem legitimised to govern the social consequences of 
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the crisis. While it is true that the current situation is very different from the 
situation in Europe between the two wars, nevertheless we can note that 
today, just as yesterday, changes in the labour market and an increase in 
economic inequalities linked to the development of the neoliberal capitalist 
system are accompanied by a widespread decline in the Western political 
class’s ability to handle such phenomena by providing adequate levels of social 
welfare.  
In addition, we must also consider the effects of the economic recession 
which began in 2008 and continues to have an effect ten years on. From this 
perspective, this paper argues that immigrants (as well as other minority 
groups, such as travelling peoples) simultaneously perform two roles: a) as a 
scapegoat blamed for problems which really arise on a macro-structural level, 
and b) as a ‘mirror’ or ‘lens’ through which to view a condition of progressive 
‘estrangement’ which ever-growing numbers of Europeans are experiencing in 
their relationships to the world of work and the provisions of public welfare 
systems. We could say that immigrants perform a revelatory role unmasking a 
situation of social fragility which not only affects them but is also spreading to 
European populations. This is why foreign nationals (with their cultural 
differences and the difficulties which go with them) arouse deep-rooted fears 
in the wider population which can be kept at a distance or even denied by 
rejecting immigrants. 
The argument of this paper will be elaborated through a conceptual 
framework comprising three sections: 
1. In the first section, we challenge the interpretation that immigrants are 
perceived as enemies only because of their cultural differences from the 
Italian population. We argue that the construction of the ‘enemy’ label 
is actually the product of a large segment of the native population 
experiencing financial and existential uncertainty, together with 
immigrants being exploited by the political and social elite in order to 
legitimise their power in the eyes of the native population; 
2. In the second section, we present a summary of the growth of 
economic inequality on a global level and in Italy in particular, 
interpreting it as an element of social anomy, a sign of the declining 
legitimacy of the political classes and as a mirror showing us the 
changed relationships between social classes in a context characterised 
by the contraction of public systems for redistribution of wealth; 
3. In the third and final section, we discuss the role performed by 
immigration as a mirror through which it is possible to reveal what is 
rarely revealed in public and political debates, i.e. that the changes 
wrought in economic and production systems make it ever more 
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difficult to ensure an effective process of social integration for 
everybody, making citizens ever more ‘estranged’ from each other. 
2.  The construction of the image of immigrants as ‘enemies’ and 
‘scapegoats’ 
For more than twenty years now, immigration has been one of the most 
hotly debated issues in the mass media and in European politics. In Italy, the 
conceptual representations used to describe this complex phenomenon are 
characterized by fear, suspicion of foreigners and attention focused on the 
elements of conflict and competition for access to the labour market and to 
social welfare resources (Morowska, 2005). The migratory flows from African, 
Middle-Eastern and Asian countries are presented to the public as an 
uncontrollable phenomenon which could potentially lead to millions of 
humans moving to our continent (Colombo, 2012). Ambrosini (2010) shows 
how military-style metaphors are used in the public debate on immigration: 
‘invasion’, ‘defence of borders’, ‘ethnic replacement’, ‘Islamization’. What is 
really conveyed by these terms is that immigration could lead to the 
disappearance of the collective consciousness as understood by Durkheim 
(2016), in other words the loss of the set of norms and shared values 
belonging to European societies. As in a war, those responsible for that loss 
can be easily identified: the ‘enemies’, or the ‘conquerors’, are the ‘immigrants’, 
the ‘illegal aliens’, the ‘Islamics’, all of whom can be easily recognized thanks 
to their ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds (Maneri, 2009). 
This work of creating an ‘enemy’ in the media has been ongoing for at 
least two decades. Using a qualitative study carried out between 2005 and 2009 
on the articles published by the three biggest-selling Italian national 
newspapers (Corriere della Sera, la Repubblica and Il Giornale), Calvanese (2011) 
shows that these three major organs of public information together produced 
more than 11,000 articles about immigrants to Italy over that five-year period. 
Almost 60% of those articles centred on crimes having some kind of link to 
immigration, while only a minority (20%) of articles focused on the issue of 
immigrants’ right to remain in Italy or matters regarding the opportunities 
offered by the Italian social welfare system (20%). The newspapers examined 
published almost all the news items relating to illicit acts committed by foreign 
nationals which arrived in the newsrooms, with only a minimal difference 
(3.5%) between the number of news items reported and those actually 
published in the papers. Conversely, the difference between the number of 
news stories relating to illicit acts committed by Italian nationals reported and 
those actually published was much higher (more than 30%). This means that 
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the crimes committed by Italians were underrepresented compared with those 
committed by foreign nationals. In the first three months of 2010 (at the 
height of the economic crisis), in the two TV news programmes with the 
biggest audiences in Italy (Channel 1 and Channel 5), crime – almost always 
committed by an immigrant – took up the vast majority of the airtime 
dedicated to ‘anxiety-inducing’ news items (72.3% of stories on Channel 5 and 
82.3% of those aired on Channel 1) when we could have expected to see 
much more airtime dedicated to the social consequences of the recession 
(Osservatorio europeo sulla sicureaza, 2012).  
This media bombardment has doubtlessly influenced the hostile attitude 
of Italians towards immigrants and refugees, who are seen as a danger to law 
and order and as conduits of cultural values which are hostile to and 
incompatible with Western democratic values (Dal Lago, 2012). 
The process of imposing this image of immigrants as enemies began in 
the late 1990s, a time marked by intense migratory flows and heated political 
debate among the various national parties about the acute economic and 
financial crisis in a country marked by the diminishing ability of the national 
political class to handle the crisis. In an era of increasing globalisation and 
widespread delocalisation of businesses, it is clear that policies and apparatus 
for controlling immigration constitute, among other things, an instrument for 
politically and symbolically legitimising the authority of the national State in a 
globalised world. Ambrosini (2014) argues that, today, immigration policies 
are one of the few areas in which the State can exercise its authority 
unchallenged. Defence of the country’s borders thus becomes the expression 
of the existence and legitimacy of the authority of the State and also the 
dominant political classes. Similarly, Dal Lago (2012) notes that in a world of 
uncertainty of many kinds (financial, existential and employment-related in 
particular) dealing with immigration constitutes for politicians and the public 
bureaucracy machine an operative and symbolic space with which to ‘… 
ensure control of society and the functioning of the public control system’ 
(Dal Lago 2012: 245). 
Therefore, representing migration as a danger to law and order and also 
to the cultural and moral cohesion of European nations has also served to re-
establish where the nation’s borders lie, and to reinforce the boundaries of a 
collective identity – both Italian and European – undermined by globalisation 
and constructed as opposition to foreigners (Campesi, 2015). 
However, immigration is also an effective means for legitimising the 
dominant political and social system. According to several authors (Dal Lago, 
2012; Melossi, 2002; Sigona, 2009; Vitale, 2009; Wacquant, 2002), emphasising 
the perils posed by immigration and by ethnic minorities (in particular, 
travelling peoples) aids the creation of consent expressed towards political and 
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social elites in times of economic crisis. Pointing the finger at immigrants as 
the cause of the economic difficulties and the diminishment of the quality of 
life of the native population provides a handy scapegoat to political leaders, 
allowing them to shift the focus of the public’s discontent and exploit anger in 
such as way as to consolidate both their political power and the framework 
supporting the dominant classes. 
Melossi (2002) argues that the way immigration is represented to the 
general public by the mass media plays a highly important role in ensuring 
effective social control over the continued reproduction of the dominant 
social configurations, in other words in maintaining social domination. For 
Melossi (2002), in a democratic system, criminalisation of ethic minorities 
occurs when a long-term economic crisis makes it very difficult to keep the 
social tension produced by the market system under control through 
redistribution of a part of the availability wealth, or in other words, the surplus 
value. In a context where redistribution of wealth has been frozen, the 
dominant classes use fear and suspicion – which often arises towards minority 
groups – to legitimise their own positions of power in the eyes of the 
population at large. This is brought about by focusing on the ‘crimewave’ and 
the consequent necessity to construct an enormous crime-containment 
structure which can be managed only by the social elites. Wacquant (2010) 
holds that focusing on the danger to law and order represented by ethnic 
minorities serves to hide the contradictions at the core of the neoliberal 
economic system, such as lack of job security, economic inequalities, the 
individualisation of risk and lack of social solidarity. Since, initially at least, it is 
immigrants and ethnic minorities who are most exposed to the contradictions 
of the dominant economic system (given their generally lower levels of 
education, their relative lack of political and union protection and the little 
social support they receive), the repressive reaction of the State is directed at 
them. This serves both to defuse these groups’ potential for protest and, 
above all, to construct a new social reality through the creation of cultural 
representations which transform the needs arising from social issues (in 
particular, from class inequalities) into matters of law and order. 
Immigration has certainly had a huge impact on contemporary economic 
systems and labour markets at a time when the capitalist system has been 
undergoing enormous transformations and States have been seeing their 
legitimacy progressively diminished. According to the OECD (2014), in the 
past 10 years immigrants have accounted for more than 70% of the increase in 
jobs in Europe and 47% in the USA, revitalising entire sectors of the economy 
which were in crisis or accelerating the development of those with positive 
growth trends. In Italy, immigrants contributed 8.8% of the national wealth in 
2014, with a total value of over 123 billion Euros (Fondazione Leone 
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Moressa, 2015), despite often finding themselves having to work with irregular 
contracts, with little or no protection from trade unions and with low salaries 
in return for the amount of work they do (see Allievi and Dalla Zuanna, 2016; 
Ambrosini, 2010, 2014; Koser, 2009). In certain sectors, such as care services, 
agriculture, construction, transport and tourist services, foreign nationals 
constitute the majority of the total number of workers and their work helps to 
keep the prices of the products and services offered to consumers low 
(Fondazione Leone Moressa, 2015). In Italy, the changes in the labour market 
related to the presence of immigrant manpower have taken place within the 
framework of a social context marked by a long-term economic crisis and 
persistent difficulties in finding work (exacerbated after the crash of 2009) and 
also by profound and growing economic inequalities affecting a majority of 
the population. This characterisation of the figure of the immigrant as an 
‘enemy’ has developed in a social system which has shown itself to be 
progressively less able to protect its people from the consequences of losing 
their employment and of seeing the effective purchasing power provided by 
their salaries diminished (ILO, 2016). This society needs immigrants to work 
in order to keep its production system competitive, but at the same time – at 
least in part due to continuous media pressure and political slogans – has 
constructed an image of immigrants as unfair competitors on the job market 
and in obtaining welfare resources. In this way, the increase in economic 
inequalities and the reduction in real income (which are the product of the 
dominance of capital income over earned income) are not ascribed as structural 
causes of the internal economic crisis in our society – causes which, on the 
contrary, are transformed into a subjective feeling of having one’s opportunities 
to achieve success limited by external factors, such as jobs being stolen by 
immigrants. We could also say that, from this perspective, it is not only 
immigrants who experience an anomic condition, as understood by Melossi 
(2002), of subjectively perceiving that they live in an unfair society which 
curtails their prospects for self-fulfilment (achievement of their goals) because 
of the widespread inequalities in the spheres of culture, religion and language, 
as well as those of work and income. Indeed, many Italians experience a 
similar situation, as they are discovering how difficult it is today to count on 
levels of income which will be sufficient to protect them from the risk of 
poverty, and how this situation is caused by an unfair society, one which 
generates great wealth but redistributes progressively less of it. 
Therefore, in order to fully understand the meaning of the construction 
and use of the ‘immigrant as enemy’ category, we must look more closely at 
the context of growing economic inequalities and the consequent reduction in 
the economic and political elites’ ability to meet the population’s needs. In the 
next section, we analyse the dynamics behind the development of this 
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economic inequality on the international scene and in Italy and attempt to 
demonstrate how it is linked to the decrease in the resources invested in 
public welfare and the fossilisation of class structures resulting from this. 
3.  The increase in inequality as a factor in the declining legitimacy of 
political elites 
In his famous book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty 
(2014) underlines that the increase in internal inequality currently 
characterising almost all societies around the world should essentially be 
traced back to two factors: on the one hand, to an increase in the earned 
income of the richest 10% of the population compared with the poorest 50%, 
and on the other, to an even greater concentration of capital income in the 
richest 10%. 
Concerning inequality in earned income, Piketty (2014) shows how, 
today, in the countries with medium levels of inequality (such as European 
states), the highest-paid 10% receives around 25-30% of the total earnings, 
while the 50% with the lowest income receives around 30% of the total 
earned income in that nation. In countries with high levels of inequality (for 
example the USA, but also many Commonwealth nations), the upper 10% 
receives around 35% of the total earnings, while the 50% with the lowest 
earnings has to make do with only 10% of the total earned income (Piketty, 
2014). 
This increase in earned-income inequality, which began around the 
beginning of the 1970s in the USA and the 1980s in Europe, displays a non-
uniform internal distribution. In particular, Piketty stresses that, within the 
tenth of the population with the highest earned income – which the French 
economist defines the ‘wealthy classes’ – there is a considerable difference 
between those the author terms ‘dominant classes’ (those found in the top 
1%) and the remaining 9% (Piketty, 2014. It is in this numerically small 
dominant class that the concentration of earned income reaches its peak, both 
in Europe (where this 1% of the population accounts for around 7% of the 
total wages, salaries and pensions) and – above all – in the USA (where this 
small group accounts for 12% of the total earned income). Piketty also shows 
that these high-earning groups, despite being numerically small, are much 
larger groups than the few hundred families that, up to the end of the Second 
World War, constituted the traditional European and North American elite. 
Indeed, in the USA the percentile with the highest earnings comprises around 
2.6 million people (Piketty, 2014), while in Italy the same group comprises 
approximately 400,000 people. Therefore we are not talking about groups with 
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almost negligible numbers, but relatively populous segments making up a very 
rich and influential social class. 
Piketty attributes the causes of the increased inequality in the distribution 
of earned income to various different factors. For example, the fact that 
developments in technology are leading to continual changes in production 
systems is a spur for intense competition between businesses to secure the 
services of the people with the best professional competences and 
qualifications by offering high salaries. Furthermore, Piketty (2014) mentions 
the fact that many of these professionals sit on the boards of large 
corporations, meaning that they are able to set their own salary levels. It 
should be noted that the growth of inequality is a constant also in times of 
economic crisis when the earned income of the majority of the population 
tends to decrease (Franzini and Pianta, 2016). In these times of crisis, we can 
witness an accentuation of the inequality in earned income between the top 
ten percent and the middle classes. In his essay The Price of Inequality, Joseph 
Stiglitz (2014) shows that economic inequality in America increased at the 
time of the economic crisis; between 2009 and 2010, the richest 1% of the US 
population received approximately 93% of the extraordinary income 
generated in the country. Also in Europe, the top percentile saw its income 
increase more than that of the middle classes, albeit with lesser levels of 
inequality compared with the USA and the major Commonwealth nations 
(Alvaredo et al., 2013).  
Piketty’s greatest merit, however, is his demonstrating that the biggest 
factor in economic inequality is still today related to capital income. In 
European societies – those with ‘medium inequality’ – the richest 10% of the 
population (what we could call the ‘upper class’) owns on average around 60% 
of the total capital, while in the USA this same group owns 70%. Again, 
within this group the concentration is further heightened within the ‘dominant 
class’. This 1% of the total population owns on average 25% of the capital 
property in Europe and 35% in the USA (Piketty, 2014: 379). All this comes 
together to produce a situation characterised by an escalation in the overall 
inequalities in wealth in almost every country in the world. Yet this is not all: 
since the returns on capital are less susceptible to economic crises and to 
reductions in earned income, in times of economic crisis the gap between rich 
and poor widens. 
The criticism of the ‘top 1%’ made by global protest movements such as 
Occupy Wall Street, using the slogan ‘We are the 99 percent’, captures a 
widespread feeling of grave injustice experienced by almost the whole 
population; people find themselves being poorer and poorer despite their 
individual efforts, while a small segment of the population stays rich mainly 
because of capital passed down from one generation to the next. If we 
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consider that, in 2016, just over thirty-three million people (0.7% of the world 
population) possessed a share of the total wealth in the world amounting to 
more than one hundred and sixteen thousand billion dollars (a figure in excess 
of 3,515,000 dollars a year per head), while the poorest 92% (amounting to 
four and a half billion people) possessed a share of the wealth totalling around 
thirty-five thousand billion dollars – meaning an average pro capite wealth of 
less than 8,000 Euros (Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2016) we can realise 
that we are effectively witnessing once again the formation of strict class 
segmentation following the State systems for redistribution of wealth being 
thrown into crisis by the economic changes wrought by the introduction of 
the neoliberal model.  
Certain authors (see e.g. Ricolfi and Cima, 015) dispute the fact that the 
growth in economic inequality has taken place on a global level or that it 
displays a constant trend. According to these authors, recent economic 
dynamics actually show a drop in the Gini index between the various states, 
leading to greater balance in the global distribution of wealth. This objection 
does contain some kernels of truth, as the income available to the world 
population has certainly increased (especially if we consider China and India), 
but if we examine the inequality dynamics within each state we can see that 
inequality between the different social classes is progressively growing, in part 
caused by the decline of the Welfare State. Moreover, in the first decade of the 
2000s, the trend of decreasing levels of inequality between states ground to a 
halt, with levels remaining stable overall (Esping-Andersen and Myles, 2009; 
Franzini and Pianta, 2016). 
Therefore, we can see that the neoliberal economic system has produced 
a shift in wealth from earned income to capital income, thereby effecting a 
kind of reverse redistribution from workers and pensioners to wealthy 
property owners (Gallino, 2012). In the OECD member countries, in the 
thirty-year period between 1976 and 2006, the proportion of earned income 
(including from self-employed work) to the GDP fell on average by 10%, 
from 68% to 58%. In Italy, this drop exceeded the OECD average, with a 
reduction of 15% bringing it down to 53% of the GDP (Gallino, 2012). 
Furthermore, even when the real value of salaries and wages increases, they 
never do so with the same intensity at which the worker’s productivity 
develops.  
Gallino (2011, 2012) underlines that the progressive increase in the gap 
between a small group of rich people and a multitude of poor – or at least 
members of an ever-poorer middle class – is also linked to the public 
redistribution mechanisms regarding taxes and welfare. For example, in Italy – 
as in the rest of the south of Europe – pressure to reach certain goals 
regarding public finances has led to significant cuts in welfare and healthcare 
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spending. In Italy, ordinary spending on the national health service grew only 
by 0.1% with respect to the GDP between 2000 and 2013, the time when the 
GDP was at its lowest (Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, 2014), with 
an effective cut in spending amounting to 17.5 billion Euros according to the 
Court of Auditors (Corte dei Conti, 2014). The sustainability of the health 
system was made possible by increasing the amount of the contribution 
patients are required to make towards the costs of treatment, coupled with a 
reduction in spending on staff wages and a recruitment freeze (Ministero 
dell’Economia e delle Finanze 2014). As for welfare, the austere reforms 
approved over a twenty-year period, from the early 90s onwards, have 
lengthened the number of years citizens must work before being entitled to a 
pension – to the detriment above all of those who are currently out of the job 
market or have only fixed-term contracts – and made cuts to future pension 
payments (Ferrera,2012; 2016). 
Although Gallino’s schematisation of a struggle between two classes 
over-simplifies a social context connoted by high levels of fragmentation in 
the labour market and large gaps in the respective wages received by those 
who work, it is nonetheless difficult to deny that the increases in economic 
inequality, linked in large part to the possession of capital income, are driving 
towards a progressive polarisation of social groups on the ‘work-income’ axis. 
The two ends of this axis denote not only the two extremes of the distribution 
of wealth but also two very distinct social universes separated (according to 
Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009) both by levels of 
income – with the richest 0.7% of the population enjoying a pro capite 
income which is 400 times greater than that of the poorest 92% – and by 
lifestyles, levels of social and health care (Baumbach and Gulis, 2014; Stuckler 
and McKee, 2012), education opportunities and living conditions.  
Given the above, we can affirm that a social set-up which social 
democrats had been fighting against since the post-war period while 
supporting the development of social rights in Europe is re-forming. The 
dream of a society with less injustice, more inclusion and greater solidarity, 
one which guarantees the rights of its weakest segments, is confronting the 
reality of an economic system which is ever freer from political constraints 
and continues to widen gaps in income and assets, as well as forcing a 
reduction in the resources set aside for the welfare state (Pierson, 2007). This 
is the context in which we have to interpret the complex relationship between 
immigrants and native population in Italy. 
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4.  Immigrants as a ‘mirror’ reflecting an unfair society with little or no 
solidarity 
As Solano (2014) reminds us, the conceptualisation of the mirroring 
function of immigration was given to us by Allal, Buffard, Maire and 
Regazzola (1977) and subsequently developed by Sayad (2008). With this 
concept we mean that analysing emigratory and immigratory patterns sheds a 
light on the characteristics both of the emigrant’s society of origin and the 
immigrant’s society of arrival, as well as the relationship between the two 
contexts. Sayad states that immigration enables us to ‘see clearly what is 
concealed in the makeup and functioning of a social order, to reveal what 
some prefer to ignore and leave society “innocent” or ignorant of, to shed a 
light or zoom in on (here we have the lens effect) what is normally hidden in the 
social inconscious and is therefore destined to stay in the shadows, as a state 
of social secrecy or unthought-of’ (1996:10). 
In other terms, as Dal Lago (2012) affirms, talking about immigration 
means discussing and analysing the characteristics of the immigrants’ country 
of arrival, which reveals in particular its contradictions, some of which have 
serious social consequences. For example, in a review of the studies carried 
out on the relationship between social capital and poverty, Narayan (1999) 
shows how levels of economic inequality are in negative correlation to the 
intensity of social cooperation and the general development of trust. 
Conversely, inequality indicators display a positive correlation with low levels 
of economic wellbeing and poorly functioning government institutions 
(Narayan, 1999). The Gini index in particular seems to have a strong 
correlation – much more so than the ethnic segmentation in various social 
contexts – with low levels of general trust and a low density of organisations 
and associations dedicated to the common good (Narayan, 1999). 
Furthermore, as we saw in the previous section, since the distribution of 
wealth does not increase significantly even in times of economic growth, 
research suggests that levels of economic inequality can be considered a valid 
indicator of the presence of social rifts and exclusion. This is probably due to 
the fact that, as it is above all the dominant social groups who make the 
political decisions regarding allocation of resources, these decisions tend to 
reinforce first and foremost the power and prosperity of these same groups to 
the detriment of those with less political and economic power (Narayan, 
1999). High levels of economic inequality can also be seen to have a positive 
correlation with increases in social tension and conflict, with negative 
consequences also for the trust and satisfaction which citizens express 
regarding public and market institutions. In summary, the most egalitarian 
societies are those in which the population expresses the greatest satisfaction 
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with their quality of life as well as displaying higher levels of cooperation and 
happiness (Alesina, Di Tella, McCulloch, 2004).  
If it is true that levels of inequality have a positive correlation to the 
emergence of serious difficulties for interpersonal trust and social cohesion, 
then the State’s redistribution policies play an important role in strengthening 
interpersonal relations. To cite an example, Di Nicola (2014) demonstrates 
that the European countries with the highest levels of social expenditure are 
those where the citizens make the most positive assessments of their quality of 
life, interpersonal trust and trust in public institutions. What is more, in these 
contexts – where there is a high level of socialisation of needs – even the level 
of trust shown in their families is significant. 
The negative effects of inequality are aggravated by the fact that 
contemporary culture tends to individualise the causes of hardship, when it 
really arises within a framework of radical economic transformation in our 
communities. Beck (2001) stresses that the these transformations are 
accompanied by a profound cultural change which sees the individual as an 
isolated subject whose job it is to rationally plan their life following the model 
of an entrepreneur, within a social structure which ‘(…) is off-loading the 
responsibility for keeping up the pressure onto the individual. It becomes self-
exploitation and self-oppression, and everyone is supposed to give three 
cheers because a new kind of autonomous person is being born’ (Beck, 
200:61). As Sennett (2006) observes, we are witnessing the emergence of a 
paradoxical situation, as the focus on individual independence is accompanied 
by an increase in situations of personal fragility caused by the changed labour-
market conditions (in particular the lack of job security and lower wages), 
something which should spur us to question the value of individualism and to 
show greater solidarity. The fact is that it is harder and harder to count on 
solid support networks, since the crisis in political and welfare systems is 
accompanied by radical changes in family models (Di Nicola 2008; Saraceno 
2015, 2016) and the progressive decline of trade unionism (Gallino, 2007). 
Together, these factors paint a picture of a social system where, for the 
overwhelming majority of the population, individual freedom of action and 
independence translate simply into an increase in risk and uncertainty in their 
lives (Bauman, 2001). In this social context, the issue of handling immigration 
constitutes an element shedding a light on the enormous contradictions in the 
following spheres: 1) in the dominant cultural representations; 2) in the labour 
market; 3) in the public welfare system. 
1) On the cultural plane, immigration reveals how fragile – even 
misleading – is the promise of a modern world which is respectful and 
inclusive of diversity, as Parsons (1994) argued. This can be examined 
from two perspectives: 
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a) regarding the acceptance of the cultural differences displayed by 
immigrants, we are currently witnessing a negative overall assessment 
(publicised in the media) of foreign cultures, which are accused of being 
incompatible with Western values. Balibar and Wallerstein (1991) 
defined this type of social representation of immigrant cultures as a new 
form of racism without races or biological components, a form of 
racism based on the arbitrary selection (performed by social elites) of 
cultural factors considered as indicators of a telling difference between 
immigrants and natives, a difference which becomes material in the 
segregation of foreigners in outlying areas of cities or in ‘reception’ 
centres. Immigrants’ cultures are represented as if they were in 
themselves monolithic and immutable, almost as if they were tied to 
biological components and therefore to be rejected in their entirety; 
b) the second perspective which challenges the promised inclusivity of 
modern culture comes from the fact that the economic and social 
changes described in the previous paragraphs are constructing social 
systems marked by severe class segmentation and the continued 
reproduction of inequalities in wealth and opportunities. Immigrants 
are the largest portion of these economically and politically 
disadvantaged groups and are – to our eyes – the confirmation that the 
destiny of the weak is not necessarily inclusion and greater social 
support, but could well be exclusion and limited opportunities in life. 
2) The current mode of dealing with immigration, however, also highlights 
elements of inconsistency in the labour market. For example, while 
much is said about the need to limit the numbers of immigrants 
entering our country each year and to tighten requirements for 
obtaining residency permits, the number of immigrants entering Italy 
has always been much higher than the number established by the 
authorities. A significant proportion of these people enter the country 
illegally or become illegals with time, above all because of the structure 
of the Italian labour market and the types of jobs immigrants find 
themselves forced to accept (Ambrosini 2010, 2013, 2014). In 
particular, it is very difficult for immigrants to comply with the 
requirements of Italian law concerning residency permits in a labour 
market with such a high proportion of short-term employment 
contracts. ‘Black-market’ jobs (with no form of contract) and ‘grey-
market’ jobs (with some form of contract but with modes of work not 
in compliance with current labour laws) are especially widespread in the 
spheres of activity where the greatest number of immigrants are found, 
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such as the services, hospitality, construction, transport and trade 
sectors; in 2014 their combined efforts were estimated by the Italian 
National Institute of Statistics to be worth 211 billion Euros, 13% of 
the GDP (ISTAT, 2016). The fact that immigrants are willing to work 
without regular, long-term employment contracts allows Italian 
companies to keep production costs and prices to the end consumers 
low, and to guarantee round-the-clock home help for the sick and 
elderly at a low cost (Ambrosini, 2013), therefore freeing up Italian 
women from the domestic duties they are forced into by the family-
based model of welfare in their country. All these factors lead to direct 
economic benefits for Italians, in terms of both containing the costs of 
goods and services and increasing personal and family incomes (Allievi, 
Dalla Zuanna, 2016). In summary, while the labour market expresses a 
structural need for non-compliant working conditions, public opinion 
expects the work carried out by immigrants to be subject to rigid 
controls in order to avoid unfair competition with Italians; this is 
because both Italians and immigrants are faced with the same situation 
of lack of job security and exploitation. 
3) Lastly, immigrants highlight the contradictions and injustices inherent 
to the current public welfare system. Immigrants are often accused of 
being a major cost for the social support system by ‘taking’ a lot more 
than they ‘give’ (Koser, 2009). But is this not a message addressed to 
the population as a whole? Have we not reached a stage where our 
conception of welfare makes it seem more like a privilege than a right 
achieved thanks to the struggles of the generations who came before 
us? 
The welfare, healthcare, education and social support provisions of all 
the member states of the European Union have been undergoing 
review for some time now (starting long before immigration became 
the major issue it is today); in the southern European states, these 
reviews have mostly led to cuts because of pressure to meet certain 
budget targets. Within this context, in an attempt to reconcile the 
different needs for economic development, limiting public expenditure 
and redistributing income, the European Commission has come up 
with the ‘Social Investment State’ model. This is a way of trying to find 
a ‘third way’ to ensure the wellbeing of citizens between the pressure 
exerted by the neoliberal system to cut welfare resources and the 
pressure exerted by social democrats to ensure the redistribution of 
wealth (Ferrera, 2016; Esping-Andersen, 2011). 
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According to the Social Investment model, public spending on welfare 
should not be viewed only as a cost, but as a factor which can increase 
competitivity and economic efficiency, by investing above all in the 
factors of greatest risk, such as abandonment of education, premature 
exits from the labour market and long-term unemployment. Having 
assessed the changes which have occurred in the economic system, the 
demographic structure of European societies and the consequences of 
the economic crisis on public finances, the supporters of the Social 
Investment State propose considering labour-market entry as the best 
preventive measure against social risks, and social welfare policies as a 
factor in acquiring and boosting one’s ability to create the best 
conditions for finding employment. For this reason, social support 
policies should be directed above all at implementing active labour 
policies and measures for reconciling caregiving and breadwinning roles 
through programmes to support the unemployed and income-
supplementation schemes (Leoni, 2016). 
The problem is that current salary dynamics in the labour market are 
not enough to guarantee workers sufficient protection from poverty. 
Furthermore – in part because of the fast-paced technological 
transformations in production systems –, it is not only doubtful 
whether there will be enough jobs available in future to meet the 
demand (Kaplan, 2016), but we are also witnessing the creation of large 
pockets of the population who will have very little chance of accessing 
the new types of jobs, given their current low levels of education, 
professional training and/or work experience.  
Another factor is poverty: as poverty is a multidimensional 
phenomenon where economic, educational, family, environmental and 
social factors all come into play, boosting only job-market activation 
factors leads to an improvement in the employment prospects only of 
the most advantaged groups (those with the highest levels of education 
and income), while the fight against economic inequality gradually 
grinds to a halt in Europe (Cantillon, 2011).  
In such a worrying situation, the presence of immigrants certainly 
heightens the fear of having to battle for ever-scarcer welfare resources, 
especially in members of society with little education and/or who are 
no longer young (Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). Some authors (Alesina 
and Glaeser, 2004) have even argued that the increase in ethnic 
heterogeneity in Europe could lead to a change in the standards of 
organisation and distribution of welfare resources, leading to them 
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becoming more like in North America, given that the current set-up of 
social policies has always been based on an ethnically and culturally 
homogeneous model of society. Other studies, however, demonstrate 
that European welfare systems maintain their structural stability over 
time, even when the ethnic composition of the populations changes 
(Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). 
5.  Conclusions 
The hostility shown towards immigrants by the media and in political 
speeches is a phenomenon which certainly has a complex background and 
involves many factors. Two of these – the increase in economic inequality and 
the weakness of the political elites – have been examined in this article as the 
frame inside which to observe the relationships between the different 
variables contributing to create the type of attitude expressed by a given 
community towards immigrants. 
The picture we can see at the end of this study leads us to conclude that 
how immigration is handled links to the social, economic and political 
characteristics of a given social context. Immigration effectively constitutes a 
space for political action and the legitimisation of political action, especially in 
times when it is not easy to guarantee the electorate sufficient resources for 
the improvement of their prospects in life. The scapegoat phenomenon has 
been well known throughout history and has been used many times by social 
systems in crisis to galvanise the group by identifying an enemy against whom 
to join forces. Parsons (1994) uses this phenomenon to explain the rise of 
Nazism and the persecution of the Jews in Germany at a time when the 
traditional system of social integration (the aristocracy and the monarchy) had 
disappeared and the fragile parliamentary democracy was unable to cope with 
the aftermath of the economic crash of 1929.  
Even today, the fact that the changes which economic systems and social 
policies have undergone have led to an increase in economic inequality and a 
deterioration of the population’s effective and perceived living conditions 
certainly constitutes one of the greatest difficulties contemporary political 
systems have to face. Unlike Nazi Germany, in contemporary democracies it 
is unacceptable to exclude a group on the basis of their biological 
characteristics but having someone to blame for problems which are difficult 
to overcome is an opportunity taken advantage of even by those who have the 
task of governing today. Immigrants and ethnic minorities are very handy 
scapegoats, given their lack of integration into the society they have joined and 
their lack of political influence, although we must not forget that similar 
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symptoms affect a growing number of natives, as they face a situation of ever-
increasing uncertainty (regarding jobs, salaries, housing and their existence in 
general) within a context of constantly decreasing institutional solidarity – the 
same solidarity achieved through struggles lasting more than a century which 
eventually managed to transform the capitalist system into one with at least a 
certain concern for its weakest members (Marshall, 2002). Perhaps a part of 
the hostility felt towards immigrants is due to the fact that, to our eyes, they 
are a picture of a frightening future which is getting nearer all the time. 
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